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ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE 30
PERCENT DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE
— by Neil E. Harl*
The legislation signed into law on March 9, 2002, the Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act of 2002,1 contained a highly important provision for farm and ranch (and
other) taxpayers—an additional depreciation allowance of 30 percent of the adjusted
income tax basis of qualifying property.2  In late April, the Internal Revenue Service
issued needed guidance on how the depreciation allowance can be claimed and what
should be done if the taxpayer does not wish to claim the 30 percent allowance.3
General rules
Under Rev. Proc. 2002-33,4 the recently-issued guidance, a taxpayer may make an
election to not deduct the 30 percent depreciation allowance.5  In the vent that election is
made (not to claim the 30 percent amount), the property is subject to AMT depreciation
adjustments for its depreciation life.6  It is important to note that if an election is not
made to not deduct the 30 percent depreciation allowance, it is assumed the 30 percent
amount is claimed.7  Thus, the 30 percent amount is considered “allowed” or
“allowable.”8
In general, an election not to deduct the 30 percent depreciation allowance must be
made by the due date (including extensions) of the federal income tax return for the year
property is placed in service.9  An automatic extension of six months from the due date of
the return (excluding extensions) is allowed for the election not to deduct the 30 percent
depreciation amount if the return was timely filed.10
Taxpayers who did not claim the allowance on the 2001 return—and want to claim
the amount
Under the statute, for property to be eligible for the 30 percent allowance, the assets had
to be acquired after September 10, 2001 (with no written contract to acquire the property
before September 11, 2001) and before September 11, 2004, and placed in service before
January 1, 2005 (except for certain property with longer production periods).11  That
means many farm and ranch taxpayers had filed their 2001 returns before the statute was
signed into law .12
So how can taxpayers make the election to claim the 30 percent allowance for 2001?
The recent guidance states that if an income tax return was filed before June 1, 2002, and
did not claim the additional 30 percent depreciation allowance, if the taxpayer wishes to
claim the depreciation amount, the taxpayer can either¾
•  File an amended return on or before the due date (excluding extensions) of the return
for the next succeeding taxable year (that would be the due date for the 2002 return in
___________________________________________________________________________
* Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Professor of Economics, Iowa State
University; member of the Iowa Bar.
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most instances),13 in which case the amended return is to
include the statement, “Filed Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2002-33”
at the top of the amended return,14 or
•  File a Form 3115, Application for Change in Accounting
Method, with the taxpayer’s federal tax return for the next
succeeding taxable year(again, that would be the 2002 return
in most instances).15  In that case, the Form 3115 is to be filed
in accordance with the automatic change in method of
accounting.16  The Form 3115 should include the statement,
“Automatic Change Filed under Rev. Proc. 2002-33.”17  The
deduction is claimed entirely in the year of change.18
Taxpayers who did not claim the allowance on the 2001
return and do not want to claim the amount
For returns filed before June 1, 2002, the guidance states that
the election not to deduct the 30 percent depreciation amount
is considered made if¾
•  the taxpayer made the election by the due date of the
return or within the six-months extension as required by the
Form 4562 instructions (the Form 4562 instructions require a
statement indicating the class of property for which the
taxpayer is electing not to deduct the 30 percent depreciation
allowance), or
•  made the election by the due date of the return or within
the six-month extension and attached a statement to the effect
that the taxpayer is not deducting the 30 percent
depreciation.19  A “deemed election” applies if the taxpayer
did not claim the 30 percent depreciation deduction on the
return and does not file an amended return to claim the 30
percent depreciation allowance.20
Therefore, for returns filed before June 1, 2002, the taxpayer
need do nothing if—(1) the 30 percent allowance was not
claimed and (2) the taxpayer does not want to claim the
amount.
Returns filed on or after June 1, 2002
For returns filed on or after June 1, 2002, taxpayers wanting
to claim the 30 percent allowance do so on Form 4562.  For
taxpayers not wanting to claim the 30 percent depreciation
deduction, an election must be make not to deduct the
depreciation as required by the Form 4562 instructions (attach
a statement to the return indicating the class of property for
which the taxpayer is electing not to deduct the 30 percent
depreciation amount).21  If the original return is timely filed, a
taxpayer apparently is allowed an automatic extension of six
months from the original due date to make the election (not to
deduct the 30 percent depreciation allowance).22
Thus, for returns filed on or after June 1, 2002, the taxpayer
must either¾
•  Claim the 30 percent depreciation allowance on Form
4562, or
•  Attach a statement to the income tax return that the
taxpayer is electing not to claim the 30 percent depreciation
allowance.
Revoking elections not to deduct
An election not to deduct the 30 percent depreciation
allowance for a class of property is revocable only with the
consent of the Commissioner. 23
F nal note
Remember, the 30 percent depreciation allowance is claimed
after expense method depreciation has been claimed.24
FOOTNOTES
1 Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 (2002).  See Harl,
“Additional Depreciation Allowance and Loss
Carrybacks,” 13 Agric. L. Dig. 49 (2002).
2 I.R.C. § 168(k)(1), added by Pub. L. 107-147, Sec. 101(a),
116 Stat. 21 (2002).  See IR 2002-37 (Form 4562 and Form
2106 revised to include provisions of JCWAA of 2002).
3 Rev. Proc. 2002-33, I.R.B. 2002-__.
4 I.R.B. 2002-__.
5 Id.
6 Id., Sec. 3.01.
7 Id., Sec. 3.05.
8 See, e.g., Jakobowski v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,594 (10th Cir. 2001) (unclaimed
depreciation (over 14-years) had to reduce basis; sale
produced additional gain).
9 Rev. Proc. 2002-33, Sec. 3.03, I.R.B. 2002-__.
10 Id., Sec. 3.03(2)(a).
11 I.R.C. § 168(k)(2)(A)(ii).
12 See n. 1 supra and accompanying text.
13 Rev. Proc. 2002-33, Sec. 4.01(1), I.R.B. 2002-__.
14 Id.
15 Id., Sec. 4.01(2).
16 See Rev. Proc. 2002-9, I.R.B. 2002-3, 327, as modified by
Rev. Proc. 2002-19, I.R.B. 2002-13, 696, and as modified
and clarified by Ann. 2002-17, I.R.B. 2002-8, 561.
17 Id.
18 Rev. Proc. 2002-19, I.R.B. 2002-13, 696, amending Rev.
Proc. 2002-9, I.R.B. 2002-3, 327.
19 Rev. Proc. 2002-33, Sec. 4.02(1), I.R.B. 2002-__.
20 Id., Sec. 4.02(2).
21 Id., Sec. 3.03(3)(a).
22 Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-2(b).
23 Rev. Proc. 2002-33, Sec. 3.04, I.R.B. 2002-__.
24 Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, JCX-
12.02, Sec. 1 (2002).
FARM ESTATE & BUSINESS PLANNING
15th EDITION
By Neil E. Harl
The 15th Edition of this popular softcover book provides
lay level guidance on farm estate and business planning
concepts and planning pointers for farmers and ranchers.
The book is updated to 2001 and contains the latest on the
effects of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001. The book may be ordered by
contacting Doane Agricultural Services, 11701 Borman Dr.,
Su te 100, St. Louis, MO 63146. Ph. 1-800-535-2342.
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THE PARSONAGE EXCLUSION -
FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS?
— by Roger A. McEowen*
Overview
On May 16, 2000, the United States Tax Court, in War en v.
Comm’r.,1 held that the parsonage exclusion for a minister2 is
the actual amount used to provide a home, not the fair market
rental value of the home.  The petitioner, a “minister of the
gospel” with significant outside income, and his wife purchased
a home in 1992 for $360,000.  The fair market rental value of
the home was $58,061 in 1993, $58,004 in 1994, and $59,479
in 1995.  As compensation, the petitioner’s church paid the
petitioner $77,663, $86,175 and $99,653 for the years 1993,
1994 and 1995, respectively.  For some of the years in
question, the entire amount of compensation was designated as
a housing allowance and entirely excluded from the petitioner’s
gross income.
The petitioner spent a total of $77,663 in 1993, $76,309 in
1994 and $84,278 in 1995 for home expenditures including the
mortgage, utilities, furnishings, landscaping, repairs,
maintenance, taxes and insurance.  Based on these
expenditures, the petitioner excluded all of the 1993
compensation and reported $9,866 in 1994 and $19,654 in
1995.  The IRS, in accordance with Rev. Rul. 71-280,3
determined that the petitioner’s exclusion was limited to the
fair market rental value of the home and increased the
petitioner’s gross income by the difference between the
compensation paid and the fair market rental value of the home
for 1993, 1994 and 1995.
The I.R.C. § 107 Issue
The issue facing the Tax Court was whether the exclusion
from gross income provided by I.R.C. § 107 was limited, as the
IRS asserted, to the fair rental value of the “parsonage.”
I.R.C. § 107 provides:
“In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does
not include-
1. the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his
compensation or
2. the rental allowance paid to him as part of his
compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or provide a
home.”
The Tax Court, disagreeing with the contention of the IRS
that the Congress, in enacting I.R.C. § 107, intended to impose
a rental value limit on the exclusion, ruled that the exclusion is
the amount actually used to provide a home not limited by the
fair market rental value of the home.4  The IRS interpreted the
exclusion to be the lesser of the amount used to provide a home
or the fair market rental value of the home, and argued that
permitting a greater exclusion would be contrary to both the
“rental” language in the Code and the legislative history of
concern for equality among ministers.5  The Tax Court noted
that although I.R.C. § 107(1) limits the exclusion to the rental
value of a home furnished as part of a minister’s compensation,
there is no mention of rental value in I.R.C. § 107(2) or the
______________________________________________________
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regulations.6  The dissent stressed that the majority opinion
ignored the modifier “rental” in I.R.C. § 107(2).7 The dissent
concluded that the Congress intended that the exclusion be
correlated to rental value, and that the majority’s opinion
placed ministers or churches utilizing I.R.C. § 107(2) rather
than I.R.C. § 107(1) in a more favorable position.8
The IRS appealed the Tax Court’s opinion to the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Constitutional Issue
At the Tax Court level, neither the IRS nor the Tax Court
raised a constitutional question.  Indeed, at the Tax Court level,
the issue was framed solely as a matter of statutory
construction – whether a clergyman receiving a cash housing
allowance from a religious employer can exclude from gross
income the full amount of the allowance spent on housing or
can only exclude up to the rental value of the home.  On appeal,
however, the Ninth Circuit asked the parties whether either
wanted to frame the issue in constitutional terms.9 Both the IRS
and the petitioner declined, but the three-judge panel hearing
the case, over strong dissent, ordered the parties to brief both
the constitutionality of I.R.C. § 107(2) and the propriety of the
court reaching the issue on its own initiative.10 The panel, in
ordering the briefing of the constitutional issue, specifically
mentioned as relevant to the constitutional status of I.R.C. §
07(2)11 the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 12 which struck on
Establishment Clause grounds a Texas sales tax exemption
limited to religious literature.13  However, the court failed to
cite a 1970 Supreme Court opinion that focused more on Free
Exercise concerns and suggested that tax provisions like I.R.C.
§ 107 properly accommodate the autonomy of sectarian entities
and persons.14  Briefs on the matter were due on May 3, 2002.
The primary concern of the Ninth Circuit panel seems to be
that I.R.C. § 107 provides a more generous rule for exclusion
of employer-provided housing for “ministers of the gospel”
than is provided under I.R.C. § 119 for those in secular
employment.  Section 119 excludes from an employee’s
income employer-provided lodging, but only if the lodging is
on the employer’s premises, is provided for the employer’s
“convenience,” is required as a condition of employment, and
is furnished in-kind rather than through a cash allowance.
Section 119 applies irrespective of whether the employer is a
secular organization or a sectarian entity.  Section 107, on the
other hand, is limited to “ministers of the gospel.”  In addition,
I.R.C. § 107 contains no convenience-of-the-employer test,
does not require that the excluded housing be located on the
employer’s premise or be a condition of employment, and
extends tax-free treatment to cash allowances.  Thus, from a
constitutional standpoint, the potentially controversial
situations are those arrangements by which religious employers
provide housing assistance to clergy that fail the I.R.C. § 119
tests for excludability, but satisfy the more lenient standard of
I.R.C. § 107.  That is the precise situation presented in
Warren.15
In the event the constitutional issue is addressed by the court,
one possible view is that I.R.C. § 107 actually helps disentangle
the government from sectarian affairs by not requiring the IRS
to undertake the detailed analysis that would be necessary if the
minister’s lodging were provided pursuant to I.R.C. § 119.
That approach is consistent with the rationale of Walz16 and the
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dissent in Texas Monthly,17 and suggests that I.R.C. § 107 is
constitutional. Conversely, another view is that tax benefits
extended to religious institutions are constitutional only if they
are provided equally to nonreligious activities in accordance
with a secular purpose.  Under this view, I.R.C. § 107 is not
constitutional, but I.R.C. § 119 is not at risk because it has
broad application and is not designed to assist religion.
Possible Outcomes
In the event that the Ninth Circuit decides to rule on the
constitutional matter and finds I.R.C. § 107 unconstitutional,
the opinion would only be binding within the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit.18 The case would then proceed to the United
States Supreme Court where, given the present make-up of the
Court, it is unlikely that the Court (if it agrees to hear the case)
would find the provision unconstitutional.19
Even if I.R.C. § 107 were ultimately held unconstitutional,
religious employers would still be able to provide tax-free
lodging to ministers pursuant to the more restrictive rules of
I.R.C. § 119 – the lodging would have to be on the employer’s
premises, be provided for the employer’s “convenience,” be
required as a condition of employment, and be furnished in-
kind rather than through a cash allowance. In that setting, the
Congress would likely act to preserve the tax preference for
ministers.
Of course, the Ninth Circuit could refrain from ruling on the
constitutional issue, but reverse the Tax Court's opinion with
the exclusion being limited to the rental value of the
"parsonage" - the historic IRS position.20
Congressional Reaction
The Warren21 case and the possibility of a federal court
holding I.R.C. section 107 unconstitutional have moved the
Congress.  On April 16, 2002, the House passed legislation that
would amend I.R.C. section 107(2) to provide specifically that
the parsonage allowance is limited to an amount that “does not
exceed the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings
and appurtenances such as a garage, plus the cost of utilities.”22
A similar bill was introduced in the Senate on April 18, 200223
and cleared the Senate on May 2, 2002.  Interestingly, neither
the House nor Senate bills, if enacted into law, will have any
effect on the Warren24 litigation and, thus, neither bill will
prevent the Ninth Circuit from potentially addressing the
constitutional issue.  Both bills apply prospectively to tax years
after 2001, and do no apply to 1993-1995, the years at issue in
Warren.25
Final Point
The Warren case26 would never have arisen had the petitioner
followed the long-standing IRS position27 and claimed as a
housing exclusion only the amount representing the rental
value of the “parsonage.”  Obviously, the petitioner drew the
attention of the IRS by claiming (in some years) his ntire
compensation as a non-taxable housing allowance. The case
certainly illustrates the perils of taking an overly aggressive
position on the tax return.
It is true in agriculture and often true in tax law – pigs get
slaughtered.  Unwittingly, Rev. Warren (whose gross income
for the years in issue placed him in the top two percent of all
individual taxpayers in the United States and who can certainly
provide his own housing without the benefit of I.R.C. § 107)
may have taken all “ministers of the gospel” (many of whom
desperately depend on the I.R.C. § 107 exclusion) to the tax
slaughterhouse with him.
FOOTNOTES
1 114 T.C. 343 (2000).
2 I.R.C. § 107.
3 1971-2 C.B. 92 (maximum I.R.C. § 107 exclusion capped at
the fair rental value of residence).
4 114 T.C. 343 (2000).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Warren v. Comm’r., No. 00-71217, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
3420 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2002).
10 Id. The court also appointed Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky of the
University of Southern California Law School to act as
amicus curiae and brief both the constitutional issue and
whether the court has the authority to raise the issue on its
own.
11 It is not possible for the court to find I.R.C. § 107(2)
unconstitutional, and uphold the balance of the provision.
Either all of I.R.C. §  107 is unconstitutional or the entire
provision is constitutional.
12 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
13 Id. There was no majority opinion in Texas Monthly.
Rather, a plurality of three justices held that the state sales
tax exemption at issue was a religious subsidy that
entangled the state with religion in determining the bounds
of the exemption.  Three justices wrote a dissenting opinion
(authored by Scalia), and the three swing justices who made
up the plurality opinion issued two separate concurring
opinions.
14 Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax
exemptions and exclusions for religious entities do not
subsidize religious bodies, but recognize their freedom and
autonomy.
15 114 T.C. 343 (2000). An important point that should not be
ov rlooked is that the Ninth Circuit, even as it raised the
issue of the constitutionality of I.R.C. § 107(2), also
expressed reservations about the propriety of a court
considering an issue advanced by neither litigant and
indicated that it may, after all, decline to resolve the
constitutional controversy.  Thus, the matter may be purely
an academic exercise.
16 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
17 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
18 The Ninth Circuit includes Alaska, Arizona, California,
Idaho, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington,
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.
19 Of the justices that authored the plurality opinion in Texas
Monthly, only Justice Stevens presently remains on the
court.  Justice O’Connor also remains on the Court and
concurred in the plurality opinion.  All three of the
dissenting justices – Scalia, Rehnquist and Kennedy, remain
on the Court.
20 Rev. Rul. 71-280, 1971-2 C.B. 92.
21 See n. 1 supra.
22 H.R. 4156, the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act
of 2002.  The legislation passed 408-0, and would apply to
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taxable years beginning after December 31, 2001.The bill is
estimated to raise $33 million in revenue over the next
decade.
23 S. 2200, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. The legislation would apply
to tax years beginning after December 31, 2001.
24 114 T.C. 343 (2000).
25 Id. Both bills provide that “notwithstanding any prior
regulation, revenue ruling, or other guidance issued by the
Internal Revenue Service, no person shall be subject to the
limitations added... before January 1, 2002.” The most likely
interpretation of that language is that it does not render the
Warren litigation moot.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit would
have to interpret I.R.C. § 107 without the benefit of Rev.
Rul. 71-280, but would not be precluded from reaching the
same result.
26 114 T.C. 343 (2000).
27 Rev. Rul. 71-280, 1971-2 C.B. 92.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor had failed to file returns for 1983
through 1986. The IRS made assessments based on substitute
returns it created. The debtor made two offers in compromise
which were rejected because the debtor had not filed returns.
The debtor eventually filed the returns, claiming less tax due
than the amount assessed by the IRS. The debtor sought to
discharge the taxes because the returns were filed more than
three years before the bankruptcy petition was filed. The court
held that the debtor’s returns did not qualify as tax returns
under Section 523(a)(1)(B) because the IRS had already created
substitute returns and made an assessment and the debtors’
returns were not an honest attempt by the debtor to comply
with the filing requirements. In re Rushing, 273 B.R. 223
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The debtor owned two S
corporations and filed for Chapter 11, with the stock passing to
the bankruptcy estate. The corporations had net operating
losses for the period between the start of its tax year and the
date of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition. The debtor claimed the
losses as net operating losses and carried the losses forward to
post-bankruptcy tax years. The debtor did not elect to bifurcate
the debtor’s tax year in which the petition was filed. In a Chief
Counsel Advice letter, the IRS ruled that the debtor could not
claim the net operating losses because the losses passed to the
bankruptcy estate with the stock. The net operating losses
would then be used to decrease the basis of the stock to the
extent of discharge of indebtedness which occurred as part of
the bankruptcy case. If any net operating losses remained after
the basis reduction, they passed to the debtor. After the
bankruptcy case closed, the lowered basis of the stock also
passed on to the debtor. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200217003, Dec. 14,
2001.
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE. The APHIS has issued
proposed regulations amending the indemnity provisions
pertaining to the control and eradication of foot-and-mouth
disease and other serious diseases, including both cooperative
programs and extraordinary emergencies. 67 Fed. Reg. 21933
(May 1, 2002).
KARNAL BUNT. The APHIS has issued interim regulations
amending the Karnal bunt regulations to prohibit grain grown
in a regulated area from being used as seed outside the
regulated areas. The interim regulations also remove the
requirement that wheat seed, durum wheat seed, and triticale
seed that originates within a regulated area be treated with a
fungicide before it may be planted within a regulated area. 67
Fed. Reg. 21159 (April 30, 2002).
The APHIS has issued interim regulations amending the
Karnal bunt regulations to provide compensation for certain
growers and handlers of grain and seed affected by Karnal bunt
who are not currently eligible for  compensation, and for
certain wheat grown outside the regulated area that was
commingled with wheat grown in regulated areas in Texas. 67
Fed. Reg. 21561 (May 1, 2002).
MIGRANT WORKERS. The plaintiffs were migrant and
seasonal agricultural laborers who resided in Texas. The
plaintiffs were recruited in Texas by a Texas farm-labor
contrac or hired by the defendant, a New York dairy, for work
in New Y rk. The employment contracts contained a provision
that jurisdiction over the contracts was in New York. The
def ndant argued that the Texas District Court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendant who had no contacts with the
state. The court held that the forum selection clause was
unenforceable as contrary to the provisions of MSAWPA
which prohibited the waiver of rights granted by MSAWPA.
The court also held that the court had personal jurisdiction over
the defendant because the defendant had “purposefully
directed” its activities at the residents of Texas by hiring the
Texas farm-labor contractor to hire residents of Texas.
